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Abstract 
This thesis was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European Commercial 
Law, Banking Law, Arbitration/Mediation at the International Hellenic University.  
 
Documentary letters of credit, have gained, over time, near universal acceptance as 
means of ensuring the payment process in international sales of goods. The structure 
and operation of documentary credit transactions is subjected to two fundamental and 
globally recognized principles, namely the autonomy principle and the principle of 
strict compliance. Documentary letters of credit rely on the autonomy of the credit as 
to the underlying contract for their appeal and commercial utility. In principle, insofar 
as the tendered documents strictly comply with the terms and conditions of the credit, 
the beneficiary is assured that payment is guaranteed. 
 
The aim of this study is to provide a critical and comparative analysis of the various 
exceptions to the principle of autonomy of documentary credits; namely, fraud, nullity, 
unconscionability and illegality. As the analysis will demonstrate, said concepts have 
received a non-consistent, fragmented treatment among common law jurisdictions, to 
the detriment of international commerce where certainty and predictability are of 
upmost value. In appraising these exceptions, the current study argues that the 
acceptance of the narrow fraud and nullity exceptions shall uphold the commercial 
utility and viability of the documentary credit system, while limiting interference as to 
the cardinal autonomy principle. Conversely, this research shall reject the prospective 
general recognition of the unconscionability and illegality exceptions on the grounds 
that said concepts utterly erode the independent and irrevocable assurance of 
payment provided to the beneficiary-exporter under the credit, obliterating the very 
essence of documentary credits. In balancing the autonomy principle and its 
exceptions, it is argued that the ICC, considering its expertise in regulating 
international documentary credit transactions, constitutes the appropriate body to 
provide the pertinent regulation. 
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1. Introduction 
Documentary Letters of Credit have been repeatedly characterized by the English 
jurisprudence as the “life-blood of international commerce”.1 This description 
accentuates their near-universal application2 and may be attributed to their 
effectiveness and commercial value as a reliable medium of financing international 
trade. International commercial transactions are considered to be intrinsically risky, 
primarily by reason of the geographical allocation of the exporter and the importer.3 
The lack of a prior commercial relationship between the parties located in different 
jurisdictions further amplifies the ever existing credibility risk with regard to the 
performance of the contract. Consequently, the exporter under an international sales 
contract has an interest in assuring advance payment prior to  the shipping of the 
ordered goods; whereas the importer’s interest lies in receiving the goods prior to 
paying the contract price.4  
 
Under a documentary letter of credit, stipulated in the underlying sales contract and 
opened on the importer’s request, said payment is assumed by the so called issuing 
bank, typically a bank in the importer’s jurisdiction, and is conditioned entirely on the 
conforming presentation by the exporter, beneficiary of the credit, of certain pre-
agreed upon documents, laid down within the credit.5 It is common practice that a 
bank within the beneficiary’s jurisdiction, the advising or correspondent bank, advices 
the beneficiary and facilitates the proceedings.6 Additionally, a bank, also usually 
                                                 
1 RD Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] QB 146, 155; Intraco 
Ltd v Notis Shipping Corporation of Liberia (The Bhoja Trader) [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 256, 257; 
United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1982] QB 208 (CA), 222; 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v Kloeckner & Co AG [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 323, 
330. 
2 Tareq Al-Tawil, ‘Letters of Credit and Contract of Sale: Autonomy and Fraud’ (2013) 16 Int’l 
Trade & Bus L Rec 159,160. 
3 Felicity Monteiro, ‘Documentary Credits: The Autonomy Principle and the Fraud Exception: A 
Comparative Analysis of Common Law Approaches and Suggestions for New Zealand’ (2007) 
13 Auckland U L Rev 144, 146-148. 
4 Roy Goode and Herbert Kronke and Ewan McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law; Texts, 
Cases and Materials (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 321-322. 
5 Ibid 322. 
6 M. G. Bridge, The International Sale of Goods (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 260. 
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located in the exporter’s jurisdiction, known as the confirming bank, may add its own 
enforceable independent undertaking to that of the issuing bank. The issuing or 
confirming bank, acting as the first port of call regarding payment7, minimizes the risk 
of non-payment as to the exporter, by substituting the importer’s promise to pay for 
that of a more reputable and solvent third party; namely a bank, normally within the 
beneficiary’s country.8 This assurance of payment, dependent solely on a complying 
tender of specified documents, has led to the documentary letters of credit being 
considered as equaling “cash in hand”.9 On the other hand, with respect to the 
importer, by requesting the provision of specific documents, he is in the position to 
ascertain, for instance, the conformity of the goods to the contract (e.g. quality 
certificate), verify their shipment (bill of lading) and, effectively, to some degree 
ensure performance.10  
The international commercial practice with regard to documentary letters of credit has 
been harmonized via the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits 
(2007 revision), known as the UCP 600.11 This set of uniform rules of commercial and 
banking practice resulted from the codification efforts of the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC).12 Notwithstanding its voluntary nature, the UCP is nearly globally 
adopted by way of contractual incorporation into international commercial 
contracts.13 The ICC, although is not itself a law-making entity, has rightfully declared 
                                                 
7 Roy Goode and Herbert Kronke and Ewan McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law; Texts, 
Cases and Materials (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 322. 
8 Nicholas P Manganaro, ‘About-Face: The New Rules of Strict Compliance Under the Uniform 
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP 600)’ (2011) 14 Int’l Trade & Bus L Rev 
273, 276. 
9 Power Curber International Ltd v National Bank of Kuwait SAK [1981] 1 WLR 1233, 1241; 
[1981] 3 All ER 607, 612. 
10 Felicity Monteiro, ‘Documentary Credits: The Autonomy Principle and the Fraud Exception: A 
Comparative Analysis of Common Law Approaches and Suggestions for New Zealand’ (2007) 
13 Auckland U L Rev 144, 147. 
11 Tareq Al-Tawil, ‘Letters of Credit and Contract of Sale: Autonomy and Fraud’ (2013) 16 Int’l 
Trade & Bus L Rec 159, 160. 
12 Roy Goode and Herbert Kronke and Ewan McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law; 
Texts, Cases and Materials (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 324. 
13 Bruno Linden and Gertrud Roos, Business Contracts in International Markets 
(Studentlitteratur AB 2005) 204.  
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the UCP as the most successful private rules for commerce ever introduced.14  
1.1 Fundamental Principles of Documentary Credits Law 
1.1.1 Doctrine of Strict Compliance 
Under common law, the doctrine of strict compliance dictated that the documents 
tendered by the beneficiary, in line with the documentary credit, must comply 
precisely with the terms and conditions stipulated in the letter of credit. No 
documentary discrepancy is tolerated, regardless of how minor. Accordingly, a bank 
has no obligation to honor a presentation that is not conforming to this standard;15 
otherwise, the bank may be seen as exceeding its mandate, thus, its right to receive 
reimbursement by the applicant may be forfeited. Similarly, the rejection of 
documents that, conversely, do comply to this standard, falls outside the bank’s duty, 
thus, bringing about the bank’s liability for wrongful dishonor.16 Traditionally, the 
American courts have systemically applied the strict standard of documentary 
compliance.17   
It is well documented that the strict compliance rule has also long predominated in the 
English jurisprudence.18 In Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson Partners Ltd19 the 
court held that the issuing bank was not entitled to reimbursement on the grounds 
that it accepted a certificate of quality issued by a single expert as conforming 
presentation, whereas the terms of the credit stipulated for a certificate of quality to 
                                                 
14 Roy Goode and Herbert Kronke and Ewan McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law; 
Texts, Cases and Materials (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 325. 
15 Gabriel Moens and Peter Gillies, International Trade and Business: Law, Policy and Ethics (2nd 
edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2006) 314. 
16 Daniel Chow and Thomas Schoenbaum, International Business Transactions (Aspen 
Publishers 2005) 252. 
17 North Woods Paper Mills Ltd v National City Bank [1953] 121 NYS (2d) 543; Corporacion de 
Mercadeo Agricola v Mellon Bank International [1979] 608 F (2d) 43; Beyene v Irving Trust Co 
[1985] 762 F (2d) 4; Hanil Bank v PT Bank Negara Indonesia [2000] WL 254007 (SDNY). 
18 English Scottish and Australian Bank Ltd v Bank of South Africa [1922] 13 Ll L Rep 21; 
Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson Partners Ltd [1927] 27 LI L Rep 49; Commercial 
Banking Co of Sydney Ltd v Jalsard Pty Ltd [1973] AC 279; Golodetz & Co Inc v Czarnikow-
Rionda Co Inc [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 453; Fortis Bank SA/NV v Indian Overseas Bank [2009] 
EWHC 2303 (Comm). 
19 Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson Partners Ltd [1927] 27 LI L Rep 49. 
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be issued by experts. Lord Summers specifically said that “There is no room for 
documents which are almost the same, or which will do just as well. Business could not 
proceed securely on any other lines”.20 Moreover, in JH Rayner and Co Ltd v Hambros 
Bank Ltd21 the dispute arose from the sale of “Coromandel groundnuts” under a letter 
of credit. Upon tender of the documents by the beneficiary, the issuing bank deemed 
discrepant the presented bill of lading that referred to “machine-shelled groundnut 
kernels”. Although the court recognized that the two terms are “universally” 
understood in the trade as indicating the same commodity, it was held that “it is quite 
impossible to suggest that a banker is to be affected with knowledge of the customs 
and customary terms of every one of the thousands of trades for whose dealings he 
may issue letters of credit”.22 The doctrine is further illustrated in Moralice (London) 
Ltd v ED and F Man.23 In this case, even though the credit provided for a bill of lading 
for 5,000 metric tons of sugar, the seller’s tendered documents showed shipment of 
4,997 metric tons of sugar. As such, the court allowed the bank’s rejection of the 
presented bill, with the justification that the maxim de minimis non curat lex does not 
apply to documentary credit transactions.24 It should be noted that, unless the credit 
dictates precision, Article 30(b) of UCP 600 provides for certain tolerances regarding 
the quantity of goods.25  
The UCP 600 rules do not as such stipulate that the standard of compliance must be a 
strict one. To the extent that documentary credits equal an assurance of payment, the 
high rejection rate of tendered documents as discrepant is inclined to undermine the 
                                                 
20 Ibid 52. 
21 JH Rayner and Co Ltd v Hambros Bank Ltd [1943] 1 KB 37. 
22 Ibid 41; note, however, that in Banco Espanol de Credito v State Street Bank & Trust Co 
[1967] 266 F Supp 106, the Court required banks to have some knowledge of the appropriate 
sampling technique of the relevant trade. 
23 Moralice (London) Ltd v ED and F Man [1954] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 526. 
24 See also Soproma SpA v Marine & Animal By-Products Corp [1966] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 367; Cehave 
NV v Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH (The Hansa Nord) [1976] QB 44 (CA); Ficom SA v 
Sociedad Cadex Lda [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 118; note, however, that in Jydsk Andels-
Foderstofforretning v Grands Moulins de Paris [1931] 39 Ll L Rep 223, where the shipped 
goods were slightly in excess regarding their quantity, the maxim de minimis non curat lex was 
implemented; though, it appears that it applied only to the physical duties.   
25 International Chamber of Commerce, ‘Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary 
Credits (UCP) 600’ (2006) art 30(b); likewise, according to Article 30(a) thereof, the use of the 
terms “about” or “approximately” in connection with the quantity and/or price of the goods 
within the credit allows for a greater margin of tolerance. 
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documentary credit system, thus, justifying modern endeavours to relax the standard 
of documentary compliance.26 Under Article 14(d) of UCP 600, “Data in a document, 
when read in context with the credit, the document itself and international standard 
banking practice, need not be identical to, but must not conflict with … the credit”.27 It 
is debatable how far the margin of flexibility or tolerance in the text extends, especially 
considering how challenging the determination of what amounts to a minor 
documentary discrepancy is, as opposed to demanding full conformity of the 
documents.28 The rules of the UCP 600 are, ultimately, subjected to the judicial 
interpretation of varying jurisdictions.29 In any case, it is argued that the strict 
compliance rule should be implemented in a commercial sensible manner; hence, 
misspellings and typographical errors, that have no impact on the meaning of the word 
or phrase in which they transpired, do not result in a non-conforming document.30  
1.1.2 Autonomy of the Credit 
It follows that the commercial utility and appeal of the documentary letter of credit is 
best ascribed to its function as a provider, to the beneficiary, after the tender of 
conforming documents, of an irreversible and unconditional claim to payment.31 In Ian 
Stach Ltd v Baker Bosley Ltd,32 it was stated that: “The commercial purpose of a 
banker’s credit is more than a mere method of payment; it creates a direct liability 
upon the banker that if the seller presents the required documents in the required 
time, he will receive payment of the contract price”.33 Accordingly, any claim or 
complain that may arise out of the performance of the underlying contract, or any 
other commercial relationship, does not impinge on the bank’s absolute obligation to 
                                                 
26 M. G. Bridge, The International Sale of Goods (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 277, 
278. 
27 International Chamber of Commerce, ‘Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary 
Credits (UCP) 600’ (2006) art 14(d). 
28 M. G. Bridge, The International Sale of Goods (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 278. 
29 Nicholas P Manganaro, ‘About-Face: The New Rules of Strict Compliance Under the Uniform 
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP 600)’ (2011) 14 Int’l Trade & Bus L Rev 
273, 288. 
30 Roy Goode and Herbert Kronke and Ewan McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law; 
Texts, Cases and Materials (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 338. 
31 Ricky J Lee, ‘Strict Compliance and the Fraud Exception: Balancing the Interests of Mercantile 
Traders in the Modern Law of Documentary Credits’ (2008) 5 Macquarie J Bus L 137, 160. 
32 Ian Stach Ltd v Baker Bosley Ltd [1958] 2 QB 130. 
33 Ibid 139. 
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pay against a compliant presentation,34 or the ensuing applicant’s duty to reimburse 
the bank. In cases of faulty performance of the underlying contract by the beneficiary, 
the only remedy available to the applicant is suing the beneficiary on said contract.35 
Conversely, for the bank to honor the credit, it is irrelevant whether the beneficiary 
can prove proper performance under the contract of sale, considering that the bank is 
not a party thereof.36  
This independence of the credit from the underlying commercial transaction between 
the applicant for the credit and the beneficiary, the relationship between the former 
and the issuing bank, as well as any other engagement set up around the letter of 
credit involving differing parties, is known as the autonomy of the credit.37 This 
principle has been deemed as the “cornerstone of the commercial validity of the 
letters of credit”,38 along with “the engine behind the letter of credit”.39 Accordingly, it 
has been enshrined in both the revised version of the Unified Commercial Code 
(UCC),40 one of the principal regimes governing documentary credits under American 
law,41 and the UCP 600.42  
Historically, the autonomy of the credit was incorporated into the documentary credit 
law via the judicial acceptance of international banking usage.43 In the American 
                                                 
34 Felicity Monteiro, ‘Documentary Credits: The Autonomy Principle and the Fraud Exception: A 
Comparative Analysis of Common Law Approaches and Suggestions for New Zealand’ (2007) 
13 Auckland U L Rev 144, 147. 
35 Ricky J Lee, ‘Strict Compliance and the Fraud Exception: Balancing the Interests of Mercantile 
Traders in the Modern Law of Documentary Credits’ (2008) 5 Macquarie J Bus L 137, 160. 
36 Lamborn v Lake Shore Banking & Trust Co [1921] 231 NY 616; 132 NE 911. 
37 Roy Goode and Herbert Kronke and Ewan McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law; 
Texts, Cases and Materials (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 326. 
38 Ward Petroleum Corp v Federal Deposit Inc Corp [1990] 903 F 2d 1299. 
39 J R C Arkins, ‘Snow White v Frost White: The New Cold War in Banking Law’ (2000) 15(2) J I B 
L 30, 31.  
40 The American Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, ‘Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)’ (revised version of 1995) art 5. 
41 Richard F Dole, ‘The effect of UCP 600 upon UCC Article 5 with Respect to Negotiation 
Credits and the Immunity of Negotiating Banks from Letter-of-Credit Fraud’ (2008) 54 Wayne L 
Ren 735, 737. 
42 International Chamber of Commerce, ‘Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary 
Credits (UCP) 600’ (2006) art 4 & 5. 
43 Roy Goode and Herbert Kronke and Ewan McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law; 
Texts, Cases and Materials (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 330. 
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pioneer case of Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Banking Corporation,44 it was declared that: 
“It is well established that a letter of credit is independent of the primary contract of 
sale between the buyer and the seller. The issuing bank agrees to pay upon 
presentation of documents, not goods. This rule is necessary to preserve the efficiency 
of the letter of credit as an instrument for the financing of trade”.45 Likewise, the 
courts in the United Kingdom have been equally disinclined to interfere in the function 
of the documentary letters of credit,46 as was developed through the international 
customs and traditions of bankers.47 An early declaration of the autonomy principle in 
the English jurisprudence can be found in Hamzeh Malas and Sons v British Imex 
Industries Ltd,48 where Jenkins LJ stated that a letter of credit transaction “imposes 
upon the banker an absolute obligation to pay, irrespective of any dispute there may 
be between the parties as to whether the goods are up to contract or not. An 
elaborate commercial system has been built up on the footing that bankers' confirmed 
credits are of that character, and, it would be wrong for this court in the present case 
to interfere with that established practice”.49 This position has been consistently 
reiterated by the English judges in the subsequent case law.50  
The zealous judicial application of the autonomy doctrine is primarily due to the well-
established belief that an undermining of the autonomy of the credit would be 
particularly detrimental to mercantile confidence with regard to the use of 
documentary credits, leading to the undermining of trade as a whole.51 Nevertheless, 
it has been argued that such absolute application leaves the applicant especially 
vulnerable against improper and fraudulent demands for payment, undermining the 
                                                 
44 Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Banking Corporation [1941] 31 NYS (2d) 631. 
45 Ibid 633-634. 
46 Rodrigo Thanuja, ‘UCP 500 to UCP 600: A Forward Movement’ (2011) 18 eLaw J 1, 5. 
47 Roy Goode and Herbert Kronke and Ewan McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law; 
Texts, Cases and Materials (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 324. 
48 Hamzeh Malas and Sons v British Imex Industries Ltd [1958] 2 QB 127; see also Urquhart 
Lindsay & Co Ltd v Eastern Bank Ltd [1922] 1 KB 318, 322-323. 
49 Ibid 129. 
50 Discount Records Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1975] 1 All ER 1071; Howe Richardson Scale Co Ltd 
v Polimex-Cekop and National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 161; Power Curber 
International v National Bank of Kuwait SAK [1981] 1 WLR 1233; [1981] 3 All ER 607; United 
City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168 (HL). 
51 M. G. Bridge, The International Sale of Goods (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 295-
296. 
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balance of interests assumed in the letter of credit scheme.52 Such a position raises 
several conceptual questions as to how far the autonomy of the credit is open to 
exceptions, as well as the ambit thereof. Notwithstanding that fraud is generally 
accepted in the common law world as defense against the strict application of the 
autonomy doctrine, there is still much controversy over matters related to its 
application on a practical level.53 Similarly, the introduction and recognition of other 
disruptions, such as nullity, unconscionability and illegality, is a matter of considerable 
debate among scholars and courts, making this area of documentary credits law a 
contentious one,54 as our discussion below will demonstrate.  
2. Fraud Exception to the Autonomy Principle 
2.1 General Remarks     
 
Fraud constitutes a long-lasting, detrimental phenomenon, transpiring within the 
framework of business and commercial transactions, best described as “a cancer in 
international trade”.55  It is true that “as long as there have been commercial systems 
in place there have been those who have tried to manipulate these systems”.56 
Accordingly, the fraud exception was formulated via the common law jurisprudence as 
a remedy to counter the unjust benefit that a fraudulent beneficiary may acquire 
through the strict application of the autonomy principle in the system of documentary 
letters of credit.57 Under the exception, where the bank has timely knowledge of the 
fraudulent action, committed by the beneficiary himself, or through the use of a third 
party, and the fraud has been established to the required standard, said bank is 
entitled to refuse payment, irrespective of the apparently complying presentation, 
                                                 
52 Xiang Gao, ‘The Identity of the Fraudulent Party Under the Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters 
of Credit’ (2001) 24 U N S W L J 119, 122. 
53 Roy Goode and Herbert Kronke and Ewan McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law; 
Texts, Cases and Materials (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 325. 
54 M. G. Bridge, The International Sale of Goods (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 297. 
55 Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 684, 686. 
56 International Maritime Bureau of the ICC, Trade Finance Fraud: Understanding the Threats 
and Reducing the Risk: A Special Report (ICC Publishing 2002) 9.  
57 Ross P Buckley and Xiang Gao, ‘The Development of the Fraud Rule in the Letter of Credit 
Law: The Journey So Far and the Road Ahead’ (2002) 23 U Pa J Int’l Econ L 663, 665. 
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either by exercising its discretional power or conforming to a court injunction.58  
Consequently, the fraud exception is an “extraordinary rule”, considering that it 
amounts to a departure from the autonomy of the credit, the “cardinal” principle of 
the letter of credit law, allowing the bank or the court to examine facts behind the face 
of complying documents.59 The interest in recognizing this rule lies in eliminating the 
legal gap that the absolute application of the autonomy doctrine has created. 
Providing the beneficiary with the opportunity to deliberately defraud the bank, and 
ultimately, the applicant, by presenting forged conforming documents that the bank is 
not entitled to examine beyond their on face compliance, inevitably minimizes 
commercial confidence, as well as faith in the operation of documentary letters of 
credit as a secure financing mechanism in international trade. The application of the 
fraud exception is considered to maintain and enhance the commercial utility of 
documentary credits, restoring to some extent trust in the system, that the strict 
autonomy principle would undoubtedly undermine in such cases.60  
Even though fraud has been generally admitted as an exception to the autonomy 
principle, there is still considerate controversy in the common law world over issues 
relating to the practical application of the rule. Whose fraud is relevant? Does third 
party fraud, unknown to the beneficiary, suffices for the application of the rule? Does 
the exception cover only fraud reflected in the documents, or does it extent to the 
underlying transaction as well? What standard of proof, as well as fraud, must be 
satisfied for a fraudulent act, capable of disentitling the beneficiary to payment, to be 
safely deducted? Different common law jurisdictions have developed differing judicial 
approaches concerning these matters,61 as will be evidenced by the subsequent 
analysis of the U.S., English and Canadian approaches to the fraud rule.   
                                                 
58 Tareq Al-Tawil, ‘Letters of Credit and Contract of Sale: Autonomy and Fraud’ (2013) 16 Int’l 
Trade & Bus L Rec 159, 183. 
59 Xiang Gao, The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International 2002) 30.  
60 Ross P Buckley and Xiang Gao, ‘The Development of the Fraud Rule in the Letter of Credit 
Law: The Journey So Far and the Road Ahead’ (2002) 23 U Pa J Int’l Econ L 663, 711. 
61 Roy Goode and Herbert Kronke and Ewan McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law; 
Texts, Cases and Materials (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 325-326. 
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2.2 The Fraud Exception in the United States of America  
2.2.1 Prior to the introduction of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
With regard to establishing the fundamentals of the debate as to the fraud exception 
in the field of documentary letters of credit, U.S. case law is accepted as the primary 
point of reference, considering that the exception was first originated in the United 
States.62 In particular, the U.S. pioneer case of Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Banking 
Corp,63 is widely regarded as the foundational authority on the formulation of the 
fraud exception rule, as the first ever case where the fraud exception was admitted 
and applied in practice.64 It is referred to as having “shaped the fraud rule in virtually 
all jurisdictions”.65   
Under the relevant facts of this landmark case, notwithstanding that the presented 
documents corresponded to the ones stipulated in the letter of credit for the purchase 
of hog bristles, Sztejn, the buyer, applied for a court injunction to be granted, 
restraining the issuing bank from honoring the credit on the basis of the beneficiary’s 
fraud. In particular, he evidenced that the seller actually shipped “cow hair, other 
worthless material and rubbish with intent to simulate genuine merchandise and 
defraud the plaintiff”.66 Justice Shientag differentiated the case as one concerning 
“intentional fraud” committed by the beneficiary, as opposed to involving “a mere 
breach of warranty”.67 The court concluded that, where the beneficiary is intentionally 
fraudulent, and the bank has prior relevant knowledge, the concept of the autonomy 
of the credit and the independence of the bank’s payment obligation “should not be 
extended to protect the unscrupulous seller”.68 Accordingly, the injunction was 
granted to prevent the fraudulent beneficiary from profiting from his own fraudulent 
                                                 
62 See, for instance, Pillans v Van Mierop [1765] 97 ER 1035; Higgins v Steinhardter [1919] 106 
Misc 168; Old Colony Trust Co v Lawyer’s Title & Trust Co [1924] 297 F 152. 
63 Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Banking Corp [1941] 31 NYS (2d) 631. 
64 Tareq Al-Tawil, ‘Letters of Credit and Contract of Sale: Autonomy and Fraud’ (2013) 16 Int’l 
Trade & Bus L Rec 159, 213. 
65 Xiang Gao, The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International 2002) 32. 
66 Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Banking Corp [1941] 31 NYS (2d) 631, 633. 
67 Ibid 634. 
68 Ibid. 
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act. The court further established the immunization to the fraud exception rule of the 
holder in due course.69 
Consequently, the court’s judgement in Sztejn laid down the foundation for the 
definition of the major conditions of the fraud exception rule; namely, that fraud 
committed by the beneficiary must be successfully established, not merely alleged, 
and known or notified to the paying bank prior to the honoring of the credit. By 
contrast, payment should be made, irrespective of the above, if the claim for payment 
is made by a holder in due course or a presenter of similar status.70  
2.2.2 Following the Introduction of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in 1952 
The principles established in the Sztejn case, reflecting the U.S. position on the fraud 
exception rule, were first codified by introduction of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC), a comprehensive statutory legislation, in Article 5, Section 5-114(2) thereof.71 
Under said Article, the applicant seeking to restrain the bank from exercising its 
discretion in good faith and making payment against apparently complying documents, 
regardless of the notice of fraud, should acquire a court injunction to that effect.72 
Nonetheless, this statutory reiteration of the Sztejn principles acted as a mere draft for 
further development of the rule, considering the lack of any provision as to the 
standard of fraud required to trigger the exception, as well as the uncertainty as to 
                                                 
69 Ibid 634-635; nonetheless, the Court declared that the Chartered Bank, the correspondent 
or advising bank, presenting the draft for payment, cannot be deemed as a holder in due 
course, as it is merely an agent of the beneficiary, collecting payment on the latter’s behalf. 
70 Ross P Buckley and Xiang Gao, ‘The Development of the Fraud Rule in the Letter of Credit 
Law: The Journey So Far and the Road Ahead’ (2002) 23 U Pa J Int’l Econ L 663, 680. 
71 Menachem Mautner, “Letter of Credit Fraud: Total Failure of Consideration, Substantial 
Performance and the Negotiable Instrument Analogy” (1986) 18 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus 579, 594. 
72 The American Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, ‘Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)’ (1952 version) art 5, Section 5-114(2); according to 
the Article: “Unless otherwise agreed, when documents appear on their face to comply with 
the terms of a credit but a required document … is forged or fraudulent in the transaction: (a) 
the issuer must honor the draft or demand for payment if honor is demanded by … a holder in 
due course; and (b) an issuer acting in good faith may honor the draft or demand for payment 
despite notification … of fraud … but a court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such 
honor.” 
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whether the rule extends to fraud in the underlying transaction.73  
In particular, the phrase “fraud in the transaction”,74 as was employed in the 
codification of the fraud exception rule within the original version of the UCC, became 
the focal point of an extensive judicial debate as to its given scope; namely, whether it 
indicated the credit transaction per se, solely as to the tender of false documents,75 or 
also encompassed the underlying contract, where it becomes apparent that the actual 
merchandise does not comply with the contract specifications.76 Proponents of the 
narrow approach argue that the Sztejn case introduced the fraud exception rule as to 
the documents, considering that the tendered documents were fraudulent, 
misrepresenting the underlying transaction. Similarly, those in favor of the wide 
approach invoke Sztejn as the relevant authority, as fraud was established within the 
underlying transaction since the buyer would ultimately acquire worthless rubbish, as 
opposed to the contracted goods.77  Nevertheless, it is observed that fraud in the 
underlying transaction generally entails an element of fraud within the tendered 
documents, as a false documentary representation is required in such cases to induce 
the issuing bank to honor the credit, thus, pay the beneficiary. In turn, the 
establishment of fraud in the documents may necessitate recourse to the 
circumstances of the underlying transaction,78 rendering the distinction between the 
two concepts as de facto inconsequential. The narrow approach alone would 
effectively cover all such fraudulent cases. Moreover, Justice Shinetag rationalized his 
                                                 
73 Ricky J Lee, ‘Strict Compliance and the Fraud Exception: Balancing the Interests of Mercantile 
Traders in the Modern Law of Documentary Credits’ (2008) 5 Macquarie J Bus L 137, 164. 
74 The American Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, ‘Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)’ (1952 version) art 5, Section 5-114(2). 
75 See, for instance, Shaffer v Brooklyn Park Garden Apartments [1977] 250 NW 2d 172; Bossier 
Bank & Trust Co v Union Planters National Bank [1977] 550 F 2d 1077; O’ Grady v First Union 
National Bank [1978] 250 SE 2d 587; FDIC v Bank of San Francisco [1987] 817 F 2d 1935.                                                        
76 See, for instance, NMC Enterprises Inc v Columbia Broadcasting System Inc [1974] 14 UCC 
Rep 1427; Rockwell International Systems Inc v Citibank [1983] NA 719 F 2d 583; United Bank 
Ltd v Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp [1976] 392 NYS 2d 265; Itek Corporation v First National 
Bank of Boston [1982] 730 F 2d 1344.  
77 Felicity Monteiro, ‘Documentary Credits: The Autonomy Principle and the Fraud Exception: A 
Comparative Analysis of Common Law Approaches and Suggestions for New Zealand’ (2007) 
13 Auckland U L Rev 144, 154-155. 
78 See, for instance, Shaffer v Brooklyn Park Garden Apartments [1977] 250 NW 2d 172, 180 
where the court held that the “fraud alleged must be in respect to the documents” and then 
proceeded to examine the underlying contract to ascertain if the documents are indeed 
fraudulent; similarly, see O’ Grady v First Union National Bank [1978] 250 SE 2d 587.   
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decision on the grounds that “the application of this doctrine [the autonomy principle] 
presupposes that the documents accompanying the draft are genuine and conform in 
term to the requirements of the letter of credit”.79 Consequently, it is apparent that 
Sztejn introduced the narrow documentary fraud rule to prevent the dishonest 
beneficiary from demanding payment on the basis of apparently complying, yet 
fraudulent documents. The latter cannot be regarded as conforming to the credit. 
Additionally, it was further considered that the fraudulent documents fail to serve as 
security for the bank, as guarantor of payment, in case of the applicant’s non-payment 
or insolvency.80 The extension of the exception to fraud confined exclusively in the 
underlying transaction falls outside this rationalization, as the beneficiary does not 
utilize the documentary presentation to carry out his fraudulent action. Accordingly, 
insofar as the documents genuinely represent the goods called for, the bank’s security 
interests, provided by said documents, are not frustrated. 
Regarding the level of fraud capable of inducing the application of the fraud exception 
rule, the lack of a clear authority in this area led to the judicial development of various 
relevant standards. Accordingly, the standard of constructive fraud was formulated, as 
encompassing any conduct on behalf of the beneficiary that constitutes “a breach of a 
legal or equitable duty”.81 However, the threshold of this broad standard was criticized 
as being too low,82 making it susceptible to abusive claims of fraud as defense against 
payment. Subsequently, the concept of intentional fraud was introduced, as the 
proper standard of fraud, requiring a knowing misrepresentation by the beneficiary, 
with the purpose of inducing the other party to rely thereon.83 Additionally, under the 
standard of egregious fraud, “the wrongdoing of the beneficiary has so vitiated the 
                                                 
79 Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Banking Corp [1941] 31 NYS (2d) 631, 633. 
80 Ibid 635; where Justice Shinetag, in recognizing the fraud exception, took into consideration, 
as a supporting factor, the issuing bank’s security interest on the goods, as the bank “is vitally 
interested in assuring itself that there are some goods represented by the documents”; 
whereas in this case it would be left with worthless rubbish, if the applicant failed to reimburse 
the bank, had the latter proceeded with payment under the credit. 
81 Dynamics Corp of America v Citizens & Southern National Bank [1973] 356 F Supp 991, 998-
999. 
82 Xiang Gao and Ross P Buckley, “A Comparative Analysis of the Standard of Fraud Required 
Under the Fraud Rule in Letter of Credit Law” (2003) 13 Duke J Comp & Int’l L 293, 309. 
83 NMC Enterprises Inc v Columbia Broadcasting System Inc [1974] 14 UCC Rep 1427; see also 
American Bell International v Islamic Republic of Iran [1979] 474 F Supp 420; West Virginia 
Housing Development Fund v Sroka [1976] 415 F Supp 1107.  
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entire transaction that the legitimate purposes of the independence of the issuer’s 
obligation would no longer be served”.84 This narrow approach as to the fraud 
exception calls for a serious misconduct on behalf of the beneficiary, precluding him 
from having any bona fide claim to payment.85  
2.2.3 Following the Revision of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in 1995 
After the redraft of the UCC in 1995, the fraud rule was embodied in the new version 
of Article 5, under Section 5-109 thereof. Following this revision, the language of the 
Article was modified to proclaim that the issuer, acting in good faith, has the discretion 
to honor or dishonor a documentary presentation, while the court may enjoin 
payment under a letter of credit, if “a required document is forged or materially 
fraudulent, or honour of the presentation would facilitate a material fraud by the 
beneficiary on the issuer or applicant”.86  
Accordingly, the U.S. position as to the required standard of fraud was determined as 
“material fraud”. The Article, however, provides no explicit definition with respect to 
the meaning of the term “material”.87 Instead, the Official Comment on Section 109 
gives an explanation to facilitate the understanding of the term, as such, that 
fraudulent conduct should be material “to a purchaser of the [fraudulent] document or 
… the participants in the underlying transaction”, depriving the beneficiary of any 
“colourable right to expect honor”, while, “there is no basis in fact to support such a 
                                                 
84 Intraworld Industries Inc v Girard Trust Bank [1975] 336 A 2d 316, 324-325; see also New 
York Life Insurance Co v Hartford National Bank & Trust Co [1977] 378 A 2d 562; First Arlington 
National Bank v Stathis [1980] 413 NE 2d 1288; Foreign Ventures LP v Chemical Bank [1977] 
399 NYS 2d 114.  
85 Tareq Al-Tawil, ‘Letters of Credit and Contract of Sale: Autonomy and Fraud’ (2013) 16 Int’l 
Trade & Bus L Rec 159, 219. 
86 The American Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, ‘Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)’ (revised version of 1995) art 5, Section 5-109; it, 
further, provides a list of four parties immune to the fraud rule: (i) a nominated person who 
has given value in good faith and without notice of forgery or material fraud; (ii) a confirmer 
who has honoured its confirmation in good faith; (iii) a holder in due course of a draft drawn 
under a letter of credit which was taken after acceptance by the issuer or nominated person 
and; (iv) an assignee of the issuer’s nominated person’s deferred obligation that was taken for 
value and without notice of forgery or material fraud after the obligation was incurred by the 
issuer or nominated person. 
87 Tareq Al-Tawil, ‘Letters of Credit and Contract of Sale: Autonomy and Fraud’ (2013) 16 Int’l 
Trade & Bus L Rec 159, 220. 
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right to honor”.88 Within its explanation, the Official Comment, further, indicated, 
what up to this point has been characterized as “egregious fraud”,89 as an expression 
of “material fraud”.90 This position on the standard of fraud by the revised Article 5 has 
been assumed by the subsequent case law,91 where “material fraud” was interpreted 
within the meaning of “egregious fraud”. It is apparent that the focus of this standard 
concentrates on the seriousness of the fraud and the effect of its severity,92 providing 
for a clear criterion that may facilitate the reasonable application of the fraud rule. 
However, considering the difficulty in justifying the materiality of the fraud without 
recourse to the underlying contract,93 this standard may have a highly negative effect 
on the autonomy principle. Accordingly, the consideration of the impact of the fraud 
as to the transaction, albeit reasonable from the perspective of business interests, 
especially the bank’s security interests in the goods, requires said bank to know more 
with regard to the underlying contract while processing payment. In other words, the 
bank has to justify the application of the fraud rule by considering the performance 
under the underlying contract. Nevertheless, the latter constitutes an intrinsic element 
of the fraud rule as an exception to the autonomy principle. 
 
With regard to the scope of the fraud exception, whereas the language prior to the 
UCC revision led to an open question,94 the revised Article 5 expressly states that 
                                                 
88 Official Comment to UCC Article 5 Letters of Credit, UCC§5-109 Forgery and Fraud, Official 
Comment 1.  
89 Intraworld Industries Inc v Girard Trust Bank [1975] 336 A 2d 316, 324-325; see also New 
York Life Insurance Co v Hartford National Bank & Trust Co [1977] 378 A 2d 562; First Arlington 
National Bank v Stathis [1980] 413 NE 2d 1288; Foreign Ventures LP v Chemical Bank [1977] 
399 NYS 2d 114. 
90 Official Comment to UCC Article 5 Letters of Credit, UCC§5-109 Forgery and Fraud, Official 
Comment 1. 
91 See, for instance, New Orleans Brass v Whitney National Bank and the Louisiana Stadium 
and Exposition District [2002] LA App LEXIS 1764; Mid-America Tire v PTZ Trading Ltd Import 
and Export Agents [2002] 43 UCC Rep Serv 2d 964. 
92 Ross P Buckley, ‘The 1993 Revision of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary 
Credits’ (1995) 6(2) J Banking & Fin L & Prac 77, 97. 
93 See Official Comment to UCC Article 5 Letters of Credit, UCC§5-109 Forgery and Fraud, 
Official Comment 1; which reads that “The courts must examine the underlying transaction 
when there is an allegation of material fraud, for only by examining that transaction can one 
determine …whether the fraud was material”.    
94 The American Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, ‘Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)’ (1952 version) art 5, Section 5-114(2). 
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payment may be restrained, both in the case of “materially fraudulent” documents, as 
well as in the case of any other “material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer, or 
applicant”.95 Consequently, the matter is explicitly settled as encompassing fraud 
established in the underlying transaction. This wider approach as to the notion of fraud 
within the fraud exception rule obliterates the independence of the commercial 
instrument, allowing for a high degree of judicial interference, making the operation of 
the commercial instrument slow and cumbersome; hence, in no way equal to “cash in 
hand”.96 It further exceeds the rationale behind the development of the fraud rule 
under US law, as articulated in Sztejn by Justice Shinetag.97 Nonetheless, it can be 
largely attributed to the focus of the U.S. courts on suppressing fraud,98 as opposed to 
prioritizing the efficacy of the documentary credits and the needs of commerce, a 
position adopted by the English courts. Regardless, it is not for the banks to act as 
international policemen for the prevention of the proliferation of fraud. 
2.3 The Fraud Rule in the United Kingdom 
The fraud exception rule, although firmly recognized under the English common law 
system,99  has rarely been successfully established in practice, as the English courts 
have been traditionally very reluctant to intervene in the function of the autonomy of 
the credit.100 Fraud is referred to as “the most controversial and confused area”,101 as 
it affects the autonomy principle in the international operation of the letters of credit. 
                                                 
95 The American Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, ‘Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)’ (revised version of 1995) art 5, Section 5-109. 
96 Power Curber International Ltd v National Bank of Kuwait SAK [1981] 1 WLR 1233, 1241; 
[1981] 3 All ER 607, 612. 
97 Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Banking Corp [1941] 31 NYS (2d) 631. 
98 See for instance Dynamics Corp of America v Citizens & Southern National Bank [1973] 356 F 
Supp 991, 1000; where Edenfield J held that “There is as much public interest in discouraging 
fraud as in encouraging the use of letters of credit”.  
99 Discount Records Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1975] 1 All ER 1071; RD Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd 
v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] QB 146; Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank 
International Ltd [1978] QB 159; United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of 
Canada [1983] 1 AC 168 (HL); United Trading Corp SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 554; Themehelp Ltd v West [1985] 4 All ER 215; Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc v 
Standard Bank London Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 187; Turkiye Is Bankasi AS v Bank of China 
[1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 250.  
100 Rodrigo Thanuja, ‘UCP 500 to UCP 600: A Forward Movement’ (2011) 18 eLaw J 1, 5. 
101 Ross P Buckley and Xiang Gao, ‘The Development of the Fraud Rule in the Letter of Credit 
Law: The Journey So Far and the Road Ahead’ (2002) 23 U Pa J Int’l Econ L 663, 663. 
  -18- 
Accordingly, under the rationale of safeguarding the integrity of the documentary 
credit and banking system, as well as promoting international trade,102 the English 
position on the application of the fraud exception has been consistently a restrictive 
one, even to the point of negating the purpose for which the exception was initially 
recognized.103 
One of the earliest English cases that referred to the fraud exception was Discount 
Records Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd,104 where the buyer sought to obtain an injunction 
enjoining the defendant bank from making payment on the seller’s draft, on the 
grounds that the latter fraudulently shipped only a small quantity of the ordered goods 
in accordance with the contract requirements. Megarry J referred to the American 
Sztejn case, on the basis of which, for the fraud exception to apply, the existence of 
“established fraud” is required, as opposed to mere allegations. Nevertheless, the 
court regarded the buyer’s inspection certificate, evidencing the incompliance and 
obtained in the presence of a representative of the issuer, as insufficient to 
successfully establish the beneficiary’s fraud. It held that judicial interference can only 
be justified, if a “sufficiently grave cause is shown”.105 This case, illustrating the 
difficulty in satisfying the high standard of proof necessitated by the English courts as 
to the fraud exception, has been criticized as rendering the acquisition of injunctions in 
such cases practically infeasible.106 
The leading English authority with regard to the fraud exception rule is the decision of 
the House of Lords in United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of 
Canada.107 In this case, which concerned the sale of glass fibre making equipment 
under an irrevocable letter of credit, a loading broker, not acting as the seller’s agent, 
fraudulently backdated the tendered bill of lading to reflect the shipment date 
provided for in the credit. Subsequently, upon presentation, the confirming bank 
                                                 
102 RD Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] QB 146, 155-156. 
103 Xiang Gao, The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International 2002) 50. 
104 Discount Records Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1975] 1 All ER 1071. 
105 Ibid 1075. 
106 Ross P Buckley and Xiang Gao, ‘The Development of the Fraud Rule in the Letter of Credit 
Law: The Journey So Far and the Road Ahead’ (2002) 23 U Pa J Int’l Econ L 663, 691. 
107 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168 (HL). 
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refused to pay on the grounds of fraud, having evidence that the shipment actually 
took place on a later date. In his judgement, Lord Diplock restricted the application of 
the fraud exception to cases where the seller, with the intention of claiming payment 
under the credit, fraudulently presents documents that encompass “expressly or 
impliedly, material representations of fact that to his knowledge are untrue”.108 This 
knowledge of the material fraud by the beneficiary constitutes the decisive factor that 
can bring about his liability in the case of third party fraud.109 Accordingly, on the facts 
of the case, the House of Lords concluded that the confirming bank was not entitled to 
refuse payment against documents that it knew to be fraudulent, considering that the 
fraud was committed by a third party, while the beneficiary genuinely had no relevant 
knowledge.110 That the document was fraudulent in a material fact, to the knowledge 
of its issuer and the bank, did not matter insofar as the seller himself did not act 
fraudulently, or was privy to the third party fraud.111 The critical time as to the 
beneficiary’s knowledge of fraud is the time of presentation. Any subsequent 
awareness of the falsity of the document does not override his claim to payment.112 It 
should be noted, at this point, that, the House of Lords then proceeded to examine the 
backdated document within the context of the nullity concept,113 as will be analyzed 
further along.     
This judgement, reflecting the English approach as to the beneficiary’s liability in case 
of third party fraud, has been criticized on the grounds that a fraudulently fabricated 
bill of lading does not constitute a complying document, merely by reason of the fraud 
having been committed by a third party.114 This position seems to be in line with the 
view of the Court of Appeal in the United City Merchants case; namely, that the 
conformity of the document is determined on the basis of its character, as opposed to 
its origin. Consequently, said court focused on the nature of the document as 
                                                 
108 Ibid 183. 
109 Eliahu Peter Ellinger and Dora Neo, The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit 
(Hart Publishing 2010) 142.  
110 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168 (HL), 184. 
111 M. G. Bridge, The International Sale of Goods (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 305. 
112 Group Josi Re v Wallbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 WRL 1152 (CA), 1161. 
113 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168 (HL), 187. 
114 Roy Goode, “Reflections on Letters of Credit – I” [1980] J Bus Law 291, 294.  
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fraudulent, not on the identity of the fraudster,115 as did, conversely, the House of 
Lords.116 Nonetheless, it seems more accurate to regard the person knowingly making 
the false statement as fraudulent, rather than the documents in and of themselves or 
the party innocent of said falsity. The requirement of the beneficiary’s established 
fraudulent action, or knowledge thereof, provides a needed element of causality, 
justifying the detrimental consequences that the application of the fraud exception will 
undoubtedly bring about as to the beneficiary.  
Under English law, the standard of fraud requiring “material misrepresentation”, as 
stated by Lord Diplock,117 reflects the “intentional fraud” standard developed within 
the U.S. jurisprudence, rather than the U.S. adopted standard of “material fraud”, as it 
focuses primarily on the beneficiary’s fraudulent intention or knowledge.118 Without 
the latter, the fraud rule cannot be applied, no matter the materiality of the fraud’s 
effect on the transaction.119 However, considering that the letter of credit constitutes a 
functional payment system in international trade, the seriousness of the fraud’s impact 
is highly relevant to the bank’s security interests in the goods, provided by the 
documents. In that regard, the U.S. standard of “material fraud” may be regarded as 
more reasonable in considering the latter, as a fraud may not impair the bank’s 
security interests if it is not material enough. Additionally, another issue arising out of 
the “intentional fraud” standard is that it requires proof of the beneficiary’s “evil” 
intent which, as a state of mind, is extremely difficult to establish;120 especially without 
recourse to the circumstances surrounding the underlying transaction. Nonetheless, 
insofar as the fraud rule was developed to prevent the dishonest beneficiary from 
abusing the documentary credit system,121 the “intentional fraud” test appears to be 
an appropriate one to justify the rule’s application. 
                                                 
115 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 604, 
628-629. 
116 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168 (HL) 183-
184. 
117 Ibid 183. 
118 Tareq Al-Tawil, ‘Letters of Credit and Contract of Sale: Autonomy and Fraud’ (2013) 16 Int’l 
Trade & Bus L Rec 159, 219-221. 
119 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168 (HL). 
120 Eliahu Peter Ellinger and Dora Neo, The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit 
(Hart Publishing 2010) 142. 
121 Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Banking Corp [1941] 31 NYS (2d) 631, 634. 
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Regarding the scope of the fraud rule, Lord Diplock’s statement that the exception 
refers to documents that encompass “material representations of fact that to [the 
beneficiary’s] knowledge are untrue”,122 is generally accepted as a succinct summary 
of the fraud exception in documentary letters of credit under English law.123 This 
narrow approach; namely, the restriction of the rule to fraud manifested in the 
documents, allows the autonomy principle to be disturbed in the least possible cases 
while, concurrently, protecting the applicant from the beneficiary’s fraudulent 
documentary presentations under the credit. Accordingly, it reflects the contractual 
allocation of risk as between the parties, when selecting to trade by way of an 
irrevocable device as payment method. The parties to such a transaction accept that 
payment is guaranteed as long as the documents strictly conform with the credit. 
Hence, the applicant takes on the risk of a fraudulent beneficiary; the only exception 
being that said applicant would not expect the bank to pay against apparently 
complying but clearly fraudulent documents, as the latter in no way constitute a 
conforming presentation.124  
As a practical matter, the way for the buyer to prevent payment on the grounds of 
fraud, normally provided that the bank does not adhere to his request to voluntarily 
dishonor the credit, is primarily by pursuing an interlocutory injunction whereby, 
either the bank is enjoined from making payment, or the seller is restrained from 
claiming under the letter of credit. From a practical point of view, it is immensely 
difficult and infrequent for an interim injunction to be granted, initially, on account of 
the buyer’s inability to satisfy the high level of proof required under English law,125 
demanding “clear cases of fraud of which the banks have [clear and obvious] notice”.  
126 It is not for a bank to carry out its own enquiries when an allegation of fraud is 
                                                 
122 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168 (HL), 183. 
123 Rodrigo Thanuja, ‘UCP 500 to UCP 600: A Forward Movement’ (2011) 18 eLaw J 1, 7. 
124 Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Banking Corp [1941] 31 NYS (2d) 631, 633; see previously Higgins 
v Steinhardter [1919] 106 Misc 168; Old Colony Trust Co v Lawyer’s Title & Trust Co [1924] 297 
F 152. 
125 M. G. Bridge, The International Sale of Goods (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 303. 
126 Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1978] QB 159, 171; RD 
Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] QB 146, 155. Although both 
cases concerned performance guarantees, the approach in the common law world is that 
demand guarantees and letters of credit, both abstracts payment undertakings, autonomous 
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brought to its attention.127 Accordingly, the pertinent time at which fraud must be 
clear to the bank is the time of payment; any subsequent knowledge of fraud has no 
impact on the bank’s right to reimbursement.128 In United Trading Corp SA v Allied 
Arab Bank Ltd,129 Ackner LJ formulated a more explicit test, requiring, by way of strong 
confirmatory evidence, mostly contemporary documents originated from the buyer, 
the establishment of a “seriously arguable case that the only realistic inference is 
fraud”.130 This approach manages to strike a balance by setting a standard that is 
neither too low, utterly eroding the autonomy principle, nor too high, thus, 
unattainable in practice. Accordingly, it is evident that English law relaxed its standard 
of proof, becoming more consistent with the rest of the common law world.131 It 
shows the potential for the development of the fraud rule in documentary letters of 
credit credits. 
Apart from the high standard of evidence required in the case of fraud, the difficulty in 
acquiring an injunction is further demonstrated by the equitable requirement that the 
balance of convenience should be in favor of granting the injunction.132 In deciding, the 
court needs to weight the damage that granting or refusing the injunction will 
generate as to the plaintiff and the defendant respectively.133 In RD Harbottle 
(Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd,134 Kerr J addressed the matter by 
pointing out that damages constitute an adequate remedy in favor of the applicant, for 
any breach of duty committed by the bank. Accordingly, the harm incurred by the bank 
that dishonors its international obligations, by large outweighs any harm likely to be 
                                                                                                                                               
and documentary in character, are treated similarly as to the autonomy principle and the fraud 
exception, see Roy Goode and Herbert Kronke and Ewan McKendrick, Transnational 
Commercial Law; Texts, Cases and Materials (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 325-326. 
127 Turkiye Is Bankasi AS v Bank of China [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 250. 
128 Credit Agricole Indosuez v Generale Bank [1999] 2 All ER 1009, 1015. 
129 United Trading Corp SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554. 
130 Ibid 561.  
131 See for instance Themehelp Ltd v West [1985] 4 All ER 215; where the standard of a 
“seriously arguable case that the only realistic inference is fraud” was successfully applied, 
resulting in the granting of the injunction, preventing payment being made on the 
performance guarantee. 
132 M. G. Bridge, The International Sale of Goods (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 304. 
133 Tareq Al-Tawil, ‘Letters of Credit and Contract of Sale: Autonomy and Fraud’ (2013) 16 Int’l 
Trade & Bus L Rec 159, 199. 
134 RD Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] QB 146. 
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incurred by the applicant, whose application for an injunction has been rejected. As 
such, the latter faces an “insuperable difficulty”, in that the balance of convenience as 
to the injunction is, in such cases, “hopelessly weighted” against the applicant seeking 
to restrain payment.135 Such strict requirements reassign the contractual allocation of 
risk as among the parties by solely allocating them on the applicant. Under this 
approach, obtaining an injunction to enjoin payment has become practically infeasible 
in most English cases, notwithstanding the courts’ claims that they “will not allow their 
process to be used by a dishonest person to carry out a fraud”. 136 Accordingly, it has 
been criticized as reducing the fraud rule to a merely theoretical concept.137  
2.4 The Fraud Rule in Canada 
Canadian courts, in recognizing and applying the fraud exception rule, relied primarily 
on the cases of Sztejn138 and Edward Owen Engineering,139 an American and English 
case respectively, on the basis of which an established case of fraud is required; in 
particular, clear or obvious fraud, as well as the bank’s knowledge thereof.140 However, 
as the subsequent case law evidences, said courts were more inclined to apply the 
fraud rule by adopting the more flexible standard of a “strong prima facie case of 
fraud”, as formulated and successfully applied in C.D.N. Research & Developments Ltd 
v Bank of Nova Scotia.141  
Under Canadian law, the leading authority in this area is the judgement in Bank of 
Nova Scotia v Angelica-Whitewear Ltd.142 In this case, before payment was made, 
Whitewear Manufacturing Co Ltd, the applicant, notified the issuing bank, Bank of 
Nova Scotia, of the signature on the tendered inspection certificate being forged and, 
accordingly, requested the payment under the letter of credit to be restrained. 
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Nonetheless, the credit was honored and the applicant’s account was debited. The 
issuing bank then proceeded with an action against Whitewear for the balanced owed. 
The applicant claimed that the bank was not entitled to reimbursement as it had prior 
knowledge of the beneficiary’s fraud. Le Dain J, of the Canadian Supreme Court, 
differentiated the standard of proof required for the applicant to obtain an 
interlocutory injunction against the bank to withhold payment, where the strong prima 
facie test applies, from the standard needed in cases of disputes between the issuer 
and the applicant, following the honoring of the credit, to establish improper payment 
by the bank after being informed of the beneficiary’s fraud. In the latter case, where 
the bank exercised its discretion as to honor the credit, Le Dain J required the standard 
set in Edward Owen Engineering; namely, established, clear or obvious fraud to the 
knowledge of the bank,143 a stricter test, harder to satisfy.144  
Before reaching its conclusion, the court considered three pertinent issues as the 
application of the fraud exception rule. In particular, it held that the fraud rule should 
not be restricted to fraud manifested in the presented documents, but should, further, 
encompass fraud in the underlying contract, of such a character as to make the claim 
for payment under the credit a fraudulent one. Subsequently, it reaffirmed the 
position that the fraud exception does not extend to third party fraud, as to which the 
beneficiary is entirely innocent, while declaring its non-applicability against a holder in 
due course.145 On the facts of the case, the argument based on fraud was rejected on 
the grounds of the fraud not being sufficiently obvious to the bank that paid against 
apparently conforming documents.146 Notwithstanding that this case is regarded as “a 
lucid and comprehensive judgement, setting out the Canadian position to the 
exception”,147 the relevant issue of the standard of fraud required to apply the 
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exception was barely considered.148     
2.5 Legal Basis of the Fraud Exception 
2.5.1 Maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio 
In the English landmark case of United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank 
of Canada,149 Lord Diplock articulated the legal justification for the recognition and 
application of the fraud exception rule in the common law world; namely, the maxim 
ex turpi causa non oritur actio, or otherwise known as “fraud unravels all”.150 The 
literal meaning of the maxim is “no action arises from an unworthy cause”. 
Accordingly, it was emphasized that the courts will not allow a deceitful person to avail 
himself of their process to carry out a fraud.151 Within the context of this dictum, the 
U.S. pioneer Sztejn case had first communicated the justification of the fraud 
exception in terms of preventing the unscrupulous seller from benefiting from the 
documentary credit system, as the autonomy of the bank’s obligation under the letter 
of credit should not be of such extent as to facilitate said  fraudulent seller.152 
It has been argued that the rationale of “fraud unravels all” is contradictory to the 
generally narrow English approach, whereby the fraud exception is strictly restricted to 
fraud in the documents. If fraud unravels all, namely the bank’s independent and 
irrevocable obligation to pay against apparently complying documents, there appears 
to be no valid reason for distinguishing between fraud evidenced in the documents 
and fraud in the underlying transaction. Therefore, there exists an internal 
inconsistency in expressing the absolute condemnation of fraud committed or known 
to the beneficiary, while concurrently limiting said condemnation in practice, to only 
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fraud manifested in the documents, with no sufficient justification.153 Consequently, 
this dictum has been invoked as a supportive argument for the expansion of the fraud 
rule to also fraud in the underlying contract within the English law.154 In the same vein, 
it could be argued that since “fraud unravels all”, the fraud of the loading broker in 
United City Merchants would have been capable of enjoining payment. However, Lord 
Diplock explicitly restricted this maxim to fraud perpetrated by, or known to, the 
beneficiary.155 Hence, it is more accurate to say that only some fraud unravels all. So 
why not only fraud manifested in the documents? It is apparent that the dictum was 
never intended as an absolute statement. Accordingly, the rationale behind the fraud 
rule was never the absolute condemnation of fraud, but rather achieving the right 
balance between the prevention of fraudulent calls under the credit and the support 
of the commercial utility of the letter of credit as a guarantee of payment. Thus, the 
rule must be confined strictly to its reason. 
2.5.2 Implied Term in the Contract as a matter of Ordinary Contract Principle 
The legal basis as to the fraud exception rule was further considered in the English case 
of Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc v Standard Bank London Ltd.156 In particular, Rix 
J, when contemplating an application for an injunction against the issuing bank to 
restrain payment and, subsequently, the need to find a substantive cause of action 
against the defendant, held that Lord Diplock’s reference to the ex turpi causa maxim 
“may appropriately be viewed as an authoritative expression of the source in law of 
the implied limitation on a bank’s mandate”.157 Accordingly, from the perspective of 
ordinary contract law, he accepted the existence of an implied term within the 
contract between the applicant and the issuing bank, whereby the latter is obliged to 
withhold payment when faced with a clear case of fraudulent tendered documents. If 
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the bank fails to do so, on the basis of this reasoning, it violates its mandate,158 thus, is 
liable against the applicant for damages.159  
Although this implied term conceptualization seems to be in contrast with the 
documentary and comprehensive nature of the credit, so does the fraud exception 
itself, recognized in almost all common law jurisdictions as an exception to the 
autonomy principle.160 Additionally, it has been regarded as being in line with the 
domestic banking law with respect to the bank’s duty of care as to its customer when 
proceeding to payment. It should be, further, noted that, by this formulation, it is 
irrelevant whether the beneficiary has knowledge of the fraud, considering that it is 
the relationship between the bank and the applicant that is pertinent, not the origin of 
the fraud. As such, the implied term approach has been consistently rejected by the 
subsequent jurisprudence.161 Most remarkably, in Montrod Ltd v Grundkotter 
Fleischvertriebs GmbH,162 the court stated that “the fraud exception to the autonomy 
principle recognized in English law … should remain based upon, the fraud or 
knowledge of fraud on the part of the beneficiary”,163 thus, rejecting the implied term 
approach that requires no such awareness.164 In any case, the problem of fraud and its 
adulteration of financial systems guarantees that it cannot be regarded as solely an 
issue of private right. The law has its own interest in suppressing fraud.165 
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2.6 International Legal Instruments and the Fraud Exception 
2.6.1 The UCP Rules 
The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, currently UCP 600, has 
traditionally maintained an absolute silent attitude as to the issue of fraud and the 
fraud exception rule, deferring the regulation of said matters to the national 
jurisdiction of states and under national law.166 This position has been rationalized on 
the grounds that the UCP rules constitute “rules of best banking practice, not rules of 
law…”, whereas fraud is traditionally regarded as “the province of the applicable law of 
the courts of the forum …”.167 Therefore, it is apparent that, while the drafters of the 
UCP are plainly aware of the fraud problem,168 they have intentionally omitted its 
regulation from the UCP provisions.169 Many scholars have applauded this passive 
approach on the basis that any attempt by the ICC to develop a uniform fraud rule is 
not only redundant but, further, most likely to fail, considering the sensitivity of the 
fraud rule to various national laws and the diverse national approaches to it. They, 
further, maintain that said approach motivates national jurisdictions to regulate the 
issue in a commercially favorable manner, not detrimental to the market position of 
the letters of credit as a medium of financing international trade.170   
Nonetheless, the UCP’s silent position has not escaped criticism. It is argued that the 
virtually universal application of the UCP rules and general success have elevated them 
to de facto law,171 thus, bringing about the necessity of providing security and 
predictability to the trading community so as to promote commerce, a quality found in 
every “good” commercial law. By leaving the issue of fraud as to the documentary 
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letters of credit to be dealt with exclusively under the non-harmonized, thus, differing, 
even sometimes vague, national approaches, the UCP rules, conversely, enhance the 
ever existing uncertainty encountered by those involved in international trade. 
Moreover, the ICC’s experience and expertise in the field of documentary letters of 
credit, especially when compared to the national judges that are called upon to 
regulate the issue,172 defines it as the most appropriate body to provide guidance as to 
the fraud in the area of documentary credits.173 When left to the national courts to 
formulate the relevant rules, the lack of a commercial background or relevant 
experience may lead to detrimental results as to the efficacy and commercial utility of 
documentary letters of credit. Consequently, due to the proliferation of fraudulent 
practices, the call for pertinent regulation by the UCP rules has escalated over the 
years.174  
2.6.2 The UNCITRAL Convention on Independent Guarantees and Standby Letters of 
Credit 
As opposed to the UCP rules, the UNCITRAL Convention on Independent Guarantees 
and Standby Letters of Credit strived to tackle the issue of fraud in the relevant field, 
constituting the first such international attempt.175 Although its scope is restricted to 
international standby letters of credit and independent guarantees, it may, further, 
apply to international commercial letters of credit, as a matter of choice, if it is 
expressly stipulated in the latter.176 Otherwise, its application is generally dependent 
on the existence of a requisite link to a contracting State.177 Notwithstanding that the 
convention omitted the use of the term fraud from its text, primarily by reason of 
preventing the confusion generated by the various interpretations of the word found 
                                                 
172 Ross P Buckley and Xiang Gao, ‘The Development of the Fraud Rule in the Letter of Credit 
Law: The Journey So Far and the Road Ahead’ (2002) 23 U Pa J Int’l Econ L 663, 701. 
173 Xiang Gao and Ross P Buckley, “A Comparative Analysis of the Standard of Fraud Required 
Under the Fraud Rule in Letter of Credit Law” (2003) 13 Duke J Comp & Int’l L 293, 335. 
174 Ross P Buckley and Xiang Gao, ‘The Development of the Fraud Rule in the Letter of Credit 
Law: The Journey So Far and the Road Ahead’ (2002) 23 U Pa J Int’l Econ L 663, 701-702. 
175 Ibid 710. 
176 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ‘United Nations Convention on 
Independent Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit’ (1995) art 1(2). 
177 Ibid art 1(1); namely, either the place of business of the guarantor/issuer at which the 
undertaking is issued must be in a contracting State, or the rules of private international law 
lead to the application of the law of a contracting State. 
  -30- 
in different jurisdictions,178 it condensed the majority of the aspects with regard to the 
fraud exception rule as developed, over time, under the national judicial or legislative 
systems.179 
In particular, Article 19(1) entitles the guarantor/issuer, when in good faith, to restrain 
payment against the beneficiary where it is “manifest and clear” that (a) any document 
is false, or (b) payment is not due, or (c) “judging by the type and purpose of the 
undertaking, the demand has no conceivable basis”.180 Article 19(2) in four 
subparagraphs clarifies, by way of illustrative practical examples, the meaning of “no 
conceivable basis”; including, for instance, the beneficiary’s “wilful misconduct” in 
preventing the underlying obligation’s fulfilment.181 Additionally, Article 20 stipulates 
the provisional court measures and respective conditions that can be pursued by the 
applicant, when having “immediately available strong evidence” as to the “high 
probability” of the existence of one of the circumstances under Article 19(1).182 
Accordingly, the Convention provides elaborate and useful guidelines to both the 
letters of credit users and the courts.183 It enumerates the types of misconduct capable 
of evoking the application of the fraud rule;184 stipulates the kind of measures the 
victims of fraud may seek, namely the issuer’s rejection of the presentation,185 and the 
applicant’s right to a court injunction restraining payment by the issuer;186 denotes the 
standard of proof required, namely “manifest and clear”187 fraud by way of 
“immediately available strong evidence”;188 indicates that the fraud rule applies to 
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both fraud manifested in the documents, and fraud solely evidenced in the underlying 
transaction;189 and, finally, administers necessary guidance to courts as to the 
application of the fraud rule.190  
Nevertheless, from a critical perspective, it fails to identify the parties that should be 
immune to the fraud rule, a crucial issue for the protection of innocent third parties.  
Most importantly, the limited scope of application of the Convention, as designed to 
directly regulate only standby letters of credit and independent guarantees, diminishes 
its sphere of influence as to the fraud rule in the area of commercial letters of credit.191 
This is, further, illustrated by the fact that so far the Convention has entered into force 
in only eight states, not including major international trade players and letter of credit 
users, such as the United Kingdom, Canada or the United States; although the latter is 
a signatory since 1997.192 Nonetheless, it is considered a positive and encouraging 
development with regard to regulating the fraud rule at an international level.193 
3. Other Recognized Exceptions to the Autonomy Principle 
3.1 The Nullity Exception 
3.1.1 Definition 
Contrary to the fraud exception rule, the matter of documentary nullities may only 
arise in those cases where the beneficiary lacks all pertinent knowledge as to the null 
nature of the apparently conforming, tendered document. Notwithstanding that 
documentary nullities surely contain false data and may be forged, merely the fact that 
the presented document encompasses a false statement, even of material fact, or has 
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been forged, does not suffice for its characterization as a nullity.194 Accordingly, Lord 
Diplock in United City Merchants195 interpreted the documentary nullity as lacking 
legal effect, due to the falsity contained within, and distinguished between forged 
documents that constitute nullities and forged documents that do not. The backdated 
bill of lading, although forged as to a material fact, was held to belong in the latter 
category as it still performed all functions as bill of lading; namely, as a receipt, a 
document of title to the goods and as evidence of the terms of the contract of 
carriage; thus, was deemed as “far from nullity”.196 In that regard, various scholars 
have suggested possible definitions, concentrating primarily on whether the falsity 
contained eliminates “the whole or essence of the instrument”.197 Such an approach is 
in line with Lord Diplock’s judgement with respect to a simply misdated bill of 
lading,198 as it defines nullity in restrictive terms, requiring, for the application of the 
nullity exception, documents that amount to worthless paper.  
3.1.2 Legal Recognition 
Although Lord Diplock chose not to comment on the bank’s obligation to pay against 
documents that constitute nullities, leaving the issue open for resolution,199 Potter LJ 
in Montrod Ltd v Guundk Otter Fleichvertriebs GmbH,200 rejected the recognition of a 
general nullity exception under English law on the basis of “sound policy reasons”;201 
the latter will be analysed under the subsequent section. The Montrod case concerned 
an inspection certificate that, although, under the terms of the credit, was supposed to 
be signed by Montrod, a third party as to the underlying contract, liable to reimburse 
the issuing bank if payment was made under the credit; it was ultimately signed by the 
seller on behalf of Montrod, acting in good faith, as he was persuaded by the buyer 
that he was entitled to proceed to said action. The court held that, where there is no 
                                                 
194 M. G. Bridge, The International Sale of Goods (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 298-
298-299. 
195 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168 (HL). 
196 Ibid 187. 
197 Ali Malek and David Quest, Jack: Documentary Credits (4th edn, Tottel Publishing 2009) 250. 
198 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1 AC 168 (HL), 187. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Montrod Ltd v Guundk Otter Fleichvertriebs GmbH [2002] 1 WLR 1975. 
201 Ibid 1992. 
  -33- 
fraud, the exception to the autonomy principle does not extend to encompass cases of 
nullity, as no such exception should be recognized.  
Contrary to the English position, the Singapore courts have recognized and successfully 
applied the nullity exception in Beam Technologies v Standard Chartered Bank.202 In 
this case, according to the terms of the credit that was subject to the UCP 500, 
payment was to be made against presentation of air waybills issued by freight 
forwarders, Link Express (S) Pte Ltd. Nevertheless, the confirming bank was 
subsequently notified that there was no such entity as Link Express (S) Pte Ltd and, 
accordingly, rejected the tendered air waybills as forgeries. The Singapore Court of 
Appeal differentiated between the Montrod case, as concerning merely an 
unauthorized document, and the case at hand that concerned a true documentary 
nullity. Such a forged document does not constitute a complying one, but rather 
equals a blank piece of paper; thus, the confirming bank was entitled to reject the 
documentary presentation. The scope of the nullity exception, as formulated under 
the case, is a limited one, requiring the bank to have established within the seven-day 
period, provided for the examination of the documents under the UCP 500, that a 
material document required under the credit is forged and null and void, while 
relevant notice has been given to the beneficiary within the same time limit.203  
3.1.3 Arguments Against the Recognition of a General Nullity Exception 
Uncertainty and lack of clarity generated by the difficulty in formulating a precise 
nullity definition constitute the foundational basis for the rejection of the nullity 
exception.204 Accordingly, Potter LJ, in Montrod, assessed that a general nullity 
exception was not “susceptible of precision”, thus, “making undesirable inroads into 
the principle of autonomy”.205 This argument was discarded in Beam Technologies on 
the grounds that, although an explicit general nullity definition is indeed infeasible, it is 
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common practice for the courts to determine what is reasonable in each case.206 
Moreover, this exercise may be facilitated by way of adopting the restricted approach 
towards the defining of a nullity,207 limiting the exception to documents that amount 
to mere scraps of paper. Taking as a point of reference Lord Diplock’s assertion with 
regard to a merely misdated bill of lading,208 the determination of whether a 
document still performs the functions associated with it, can be perceived as a useful 
guideline in that regard. Accordingly, an inspection certificate signed by the wrong 
person in honest error as to his authority, as was the case in Montrod,209 may still be 
regarded as performing its function as an inspection certificate in appropriate cases. 
On the contrary, a forged bill of lading, issued by a non-existing entity,210 or referring 
to a non-existent shipment is no more than a worthless piece of paper as it embodies 
none of the functions associated with a genuine bill of lading; similarly, an insurance 
certificate incorporating the terms of a non-existent policy.  
Potter LJ, further argued that the introduction of such an exception “would place 
banks in a further dilemma as to the necessity to investigate facts which they are not 
competent to do and from which UCP 500 is plainly concerned to exempt them”.211 
The same applies as to the UCP 600.212 Nevertheless, under the nullity exception, as 
recognized and applied in Singapore, the bank must have clear knowledge of the 
documentary nullity before payment is made. The bank itself is by no means required 
to investigate into the tendered documents.213 In cases where payment is made with 
due care, the bank is entitled to reimbursement, even if it failed to detect the 
documentary nullities;214 but that cannot necessarily mean that it had a duty to pay in 
the first place against tendered documents that it clearly knew to be nullities. In any 
case, there appears to be no valid reason to differentiate the position of the bank 
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towards facts extraneous to the documents under the nullity exception and the 
recognized fraud rule.215  
An additional argument raised by Potter LJ concerned the unfairness that such an 
exception is likely to entail as to the “beneficiaries participating in a chain of contracts 
in cases where their good faith is not in question”.216 Where the documentary nullity 
does not preclude the bank from making payment, it is the buyer that will bear the loss 
by repaying the bank. Conversely, where the nullity hinders payment, the loss will be 
incurred by the seller. Accordingly, such a reasoning seems weak in principle as either 
way will be unfairly detrimental to the other party. Nonetheless, it has been argued 
that, considering that the function of the letter of credit is to provide the beneficiary 
with an assurance of payment, all pertinent risks ought to be assumed by the buyer. 
Otherwise, confidence in the documentary credit system as medium of financing 
international trade will be undermined.217 However, such a statement may be refuted 
on the grounds that, as between innocent parties; namely, the beneficiary the 
applicant and the banks, “the risk is to be taken by the beneficiary as banks trust the 
beneficiary to present honest documents”.218 The tender of genuine documents 
constitutes an implied contractual obligation under the letter of credit contract. It is 
the seller’s duty to be careful and vigilant as to the tendered documents, especially 
when produced by third parties, so that, in turn, the documents, when apparently 
conforming, can be safely presumed as genuine. As such, the position of the innocent 
beneficiary may not be equated to that of a holder in due course.219 It is, further, 
argued that the beneficiary is the only party in a position to verify the validity of the 
documents issued by third parties.220 The presentation of a void ab initio document, 
even when in good faith, constitutes a breach of said duty, justifying the ensuing loss if 
payment is prevented.  
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3.1.4 Arguments in Favor of Recognizing a General Nullity Exception 
In principle, the beneficiary’s payment entitlement is solely contingent on a strictly 
complying documentary tender.221 Nonetheless, it has been argued that documentary 
nullities, when amounting to valueless pieces of paper, conferring no rights of any 
kind, “cannot by any stretch of imagination be described as conforming to the credit, … 
as such a proposition extends the autonomy of a credit ad absurdum and reduces 
letter of credit law to a mockery”.222 Such documents constitute a violation of the 
implied term under the letter of credit contract that the documents presented must be 
genuine. A breach of such an essential obligation gives rise to the bank’s entitlement 
to dishonor its duty to pay under the credit. The purpose of the rule whereby the bank 
is obliged to pay against an on its face complying documentary presentation, 
determined as such with reasonable care, is to protect the banks that, despite 
displaying due care, failed to identify the falsity.223 This is based on the assumption 
that the apparently conforming documents are indeed true and genuine. However, 
when there is conclusive and timely evidence to the contrary, refuting this assumption, 
the documents cannot be deemed as conforming, thus, preventing the bank from 
making payment. Accordingly, to accept that the beneficiaries have a right to payment 
against documentary nullities extends to the latter a benefit designed exclusively to 
protect the banks as intermediaries, having a purely mechanical role.224 In that regard, 
the materiality of the document, an abstract concept in and of itself, appears to be an 
unnecessary requirement found in Beam Technologies v Standard Chartered Bank.225 If 
any of the documents requested under the credit constitutes a nullity, hence, is non-
complying, the bank should have the right to reject the pertinent presentation. Insofar 
as a minor discrepancy is sufficient to enjoin payment, so is a seemingly menial, void 
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ab initio document.226 
Moreover, the tendered documents that constitute documents of title, act as security 
for the bank against the possibility of the applicant’s non-payment or insolvency.227 
Additionally, under the letter of credit, the buyer trusts that he is provided with 
assurance as to the contracted goods and the seller’s performance of the underlying 
contract, in the form of the relative documents of title, as well as the other 
documentary requirements under the credit.228 As such, it is irrational to oblige a bank 
that has timely and clear knowledge of the documentary nullity, to consciously 
proceed to payment against documents that to its knowledge are worthless and, thus 
provide neither security to the bank, nor assurance of proper performance to the 
buyer.229 The innocent beneficiary’s protection should not be pursued to the detriment 
of the bank’s security interests. It is, further, argued that the recognition of a general 
nullity exception enhances the integrity of the letter of credit and banking system as it 
prevents the circulation of null documents within letter of credit transactions.230 
Conversely, the rejection of a nullity defense to payment may be regarded as a policy 
of tolerance with respect to said circulation. Trust constitutes the foundational basis of 
international trade. There should be mechanisms that guarantee that commercial 
parties are able to transact with confidence and certainty. Therefore, there is a strong 
case for recognizing a general nullity exception that defines nullity in a restrictive 
manner, encompassing sham pieces of paper, as opposed to merely unauthorized 
documents and documents comprising misstatements.231 
3.2 Unconscionability 
While a precise definition is elusive, primarily by reason of its amorphous nature; 
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unconscionability, is generally accepted as referring to circumstances where the 
beneficiary’s claim to draw under the letter of credit or bank guarantee is so tainted 
with bad faith and unfairness, that a court in equity would prevent the bank from 
making payment, in absence of fraud or forgery.232 Under Singaporean law, the 
concept of unconscionability as defence against payment was initially, implicitly 
introduced in Royal Design Studio Pte Ltd v Chang Development Pte Ltd,233 where an 
injunction was granted, restraining payment, on the grounds that the beneficiary’s call 
for payment under the performance bond was based on delays in construction 
generated by their own default in failing to adhere to certain terms of the underlying 
contract.234 Nevertheless, unconscionability, as a separate exception to the autonomy 
principle in addition to the fraud rule, was explicitly recognized in Dauphin Offshore 
Engineering & Trading Pte Ltd v The Private Office of HRH Sheikh Sultan bin Khalifa bin 
Zayed Al Nahyan.235 The case concerned a bank guarantee for the repayment of the 
first instalment in case of default under a contract for the construction of a yacht, 
payable in instalments. On the facts, the call on the guarantee was held as not 
unconscionable, as it was based on a repudiatory contractual breach. Nonetheless, the 
Court expressly held that the beneficiary’s unconscionable conduct within the context 
of the underlying contract may constitute valid ground for the granting of injunctive 
relief against payment, if strong prima facie evidence of unconscionability is 
provided.236 It, further, underlined that, other than the general indicator of lack of 
bona fides, unconscionability should be determined on a case by case basis, as 
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opposed to developing an overall definition.237  
This vagueness as to the concept of unconscionability constitutes the pivotal element 
that makes it an undesirable notion in an area of law where clarity and certainty are of 
the utmost value.238 Similarly to the nullity exception, the scope of such concepts 
should be explicitly confined, so that their application not to depend solely on the 
discretionary power of courts and, thus, possibly allow unacceptable inroads into the 
autonomy principle. With respect to the nebulous unconscionability concept, however, 
any attempt at an explicit restriction, other than general indicators, is inherently 
infeasible. Additionally, the Singapore example has evidenced that the recognition of 
such an exception, being intrinsically vague and insufficiently defined, will undoubtedly 
lead to a high number of legal claims against the beneficiary’s right to payment under 
the credit,239 delaying the latter, thus, eroding the attractiveness of documentary 
credits as a speedy and secure financing tool that has been equated to “cash in 
hand”.240  
Based on the relevant jurisprudence,241 the main area of application as to the 
unconscionability exception comprises of demand guarantees, as opposed to 
commercial letters of credit. Although both autonomous in nature, the primary 
function of commercial letters of credit is that of a medium of payment as to the 
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contract price; whereas demand guarantees basically constitute securities for the 
performance of the underlying contract, thus, their payment obligation is secondary or 
collateral to said contract.242 Considering that in the case of demand guarantees the 
bank is called upon to pay only if the principal defaults on the underlying contract, the 
issue of unfair or unconscionable calls is peculiar to these commercial devices and, 
thus, should not be subject to the same rules as commercial letter of credit, where it is 
set from the outset that the bank constitutes the first port of call for payment. 
Accordingly, an unconscionability exception recognized as to demand guarantees 
should not automatically and without relevant justification, be considered as applying 
to commercial letters of credit.  
Most notably, unconscionability relates solely to the beneficiary’s conduct as to the 
performance of the underlying contract, whereas it is a fundamental principle of letter 
of credit law that banks only deal with documents.243 Contrary to the narrow fraud and 
nullity rules, where some falsity exists in the documents, even as apparently 
complying, unconscionability solely relates to purely contractual issues as between the 
buyer and the seller. Although recourse to the circumstances surrounding the 
underlying transaction is an intrinsic aspect of an exception to the autonomy principle, 
to the extent that there is no element of defect contained in the complying 
documents, justifying said recourse, it seems that such an exception takes matters too 
far, utterly destroying these independent commercial devices.  
3.3 The Illegality Exception 
Illegality may arise by virtue of either a breach of a statutory prohibition, or a public 
policy infringement.244 Within the framework of documentary letters of credit, insofar 
as it solely relates to the underlying transaction, as opposed to  the relevant letter of 
credit contract, it is ambivalent whether said illegality overrides the bank’s obligation 
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to pay under the autonomous credit transaction.245 Under English law, the issue was 
considered at length in Mahonia Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank.246 The case concerned a 
letter of credit, issued on the request of Enron Corporation and in favour of Mahonia, 
that acted as security in relation to the underlying contract. Upon presentation of 
conforming documents, following Enron’s default, the issuing bank refused to pay 
Mahonia on the grounds that the underling contract, a series of swaps transactions, 
provided Enron, with a disguised loan, allowing the latter to improperly manipulate his 
accounts in violation of U.S. securities laws. Notwithstanding that, no illegality was 
found as to the underlying transaction, Cooke J, the trial judge, on a hypothetical basis, 
commented that, based on the ex turpi causa non oritur actio maxim, or “no action 
arises from an unworthy cause” and under certain circumstances; namely,  a clearly 
established, serious case of illegality, as well as the beneficiary’s intention or 
knowledge thereof, the underlying contract’s illegality may taint the letter of credit, 
being used to carry out an illegal transaction, and thereby render it unenforceable, 
despite its autonomous nature.247 Consequently, the enforceability of the illegality 
exception is a matter of degree, contingent on the extent to which a letter of credit is 
connected to and, thus, tainted by the underlying transaction.248  
Although the English jurisprudence indicates an inclination towards the recognition of 
an illegality exception,249 the relevant statements merely constitute obiter dicta, as 
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opposed to ratio decidendi.250 Additionally, none of the pertinent cases concerned 
commercial letter of credit, but rather referred to standby ones.251 Those concepts 
have significant differences, thus, should not be used interchangeably. Both 
instruments are subjected to the autonomy principle; notwithstanding, standby letters 
of credit and demand guarantees, insofar as their primary context of use is to coax the 
other party into performance of his obligations under the underlying contract, may be 
considered as “less independent”, being more closely linked to said contract.252 
Accordingly, the argument that the illegality exception, a concept dependent on the 
degree of connection between the commercial instrument and the underlying 
contract, should apply to commercial letters of credit in a similar manner as to standby 
ones, without regard as to their fundamental differences, is an arbitrary one, lacking 
validity.253  
Moreover, considering that the interests affected by illegality are public ones, as the 
parties are benefiting at the cost of society, it has been argued that it would be more 
appropriate, not to mention effective, for said interests to be protected by statute. A 
statute prohibiting the illegal transaction itself, and/or its financing, irrespective of the 
latter’s method, constitutes a much more efficient medium of protection than a 
general, poorly defined and highly controversial illegality exception.254 If the letter of 
credit itself is illegal its unenforceability is undisputed and the autonomy principle is by 
no way affected. Conversely, illegality solely in the underlying contract, as a situation 
purely related to said contract and in no way reflected in the actually complying 
documents, fundamentally erodes the cardinal autonomy principle and, subsequently, 
the efficacy of the independent commercial letters of credit.   
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4. Comparative and Critical Analysis 
It is often suggested that the marketability of the documentary letter of credit is 
heavily attributed to the fact that it seemingly provides equivalent security to both the 
importer-buyer and the exporter-seller. In particular, the simultaneous application of 
the autonomy and strict compliance principles appears to balance the contradicting 
interests of the parties, facilitating international commerce. Nonetheless, it often fails 
to deliver the promised mutually secure outcome, as the overly rigid application of the 
autonomy principle creates a loophole, allowing the abuse of the system by way of 
presenting apparently complying but fraudulent or forged documents. Accordingly, the 
system favors the exporter, as the strict compliance doctrine does not provide 
adequate protection in such cases.255 As with any commercial device, the 
attractiveness of the letter of credit derives from the faith of its users. An approach 
that benefits one party at the expense of the other undermines the viability of the 
commercial instrument. As such, restitution of mercantile confidence as to the letter 
of credit scheme required the development of a unique set of rules. 
Notwithstanding that the fraud exception rule has been widely accepted as an 
exception to the autonomy principle, in an effort to restore the aforementioned 
balance; domestic legal systems have defined the rule differently.256 Whereas under 
English law its scope is traditionally restricted to documentary fraud,257 under U.S. and 
Canadian law the rule further extends to fraud manifested in the underlying 
transaction.258 To the extent that fraud in the underlying contract will undoubtedly 
result in documentary fraud, by way of a false representation to induce payment,259 it 
is the opinion of the author of the thesis that documentary fraud alone covers the 
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majority of the fraudulent cases encountered within the documentary credit system. 
Generally speaking, recourse to the circumstances surrounding the underlying 
transaction is an inherent element of any concept that constitutes an exception to the 
autonomy principle. Nonetheless, this narrow approach tethers the fraud inquiry into 
the beneficiary’s performance under the underlying contract to a falsity contained in 
the documents. Accordingly, insofar as it precludes consideration of fraud that did not, 
in some way, taint the documents, it causes the least interference with the cardinal 
autonomy principle. Hence, it best serves both the prevention of fraudulent calls under 
the credit and the support of the commercial utility of the letter of credit as a 
guarantee of payment.260   
The significance of the separation between fraud in the documents and fraud in the 
underlying transaction can only be envisaged in the exceptional cases where the fraud 
is solely contained in the underlying contract, while the tendered documents truthfully 
and accurately describe the goods represented thereunder.261 This type of fraud does 
not impair the security interests of the bank in the goods, as guarantor of payment, 
provided by the documents. Moreover, to the extent that it allows purely contractual 
issues to defeat the letter of credit, it takes the exception too far. Accordingly, it 
appears to fall outside the scope of the rationale behind the fraud rule, that was never 
the absolute condemnation of fraud, but rather the prevention of the exploitation of 
the documentary credit system by a dishonest beneficiary.262 A documentary 
misrepresentation with the intention of inducing payment is an intrinsic element of the 
latter. It is worth mentioning that the applicant, by arranging for a letter of credit to 
finance his commercial relationship with the beneficiary, knowing its irrevocable 
nature, assumes all the risks that such a payment method entails, including the risk of 
a fraudulent beneficiary. The sole exception to this statement is that the applicant 
would not expect the bank to pay against apparently conforming, yet clearly 
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fraudulent documents, as it has been established that the latter is certainly not what is 
required by the credit.263 Hence, the ambit of the fraud exception should be restricted 
accordingly to reflect both the rationale behind the introduction of the rule, as well as 
the contractual allocation of risk as between the parties; whereas the wider approach 
would have the unfortunate effect of exceeding the former, while reassigning the 
latter.  
With regard to the controversial issue of third party fraud within the documentary 
credit system, the general consensus among the common law world is that the fraud 
exception rule is strictly confined to fraud committed or known to the beneficiary.264 
This approach has been criticized on the grounds that a fraudulently fabricated 
document does not constitute a conforming one, merely due to a third party having 
committed the fraud.265 Accordingly, one should focus on the consequences and 
existence of the fraud, as opposed to the identity of the perpetrator.266 Nevertheless, 
the fraud exception rule, as initially recognized within the American Sztejn case267 and 
subsequently accepted into the English268 and Canadian269 jurisprudence, has been 
legally rationalized on the ex turpi causa non oritur action maxim; otherwise known as 
“no action arises from an unworthy cause”. On the basis of this maxim, a person may 
not pursue a cause of action, if the latter arises out of his own fraudulent act.270 
Conversely, “if a person makes a misrepresentation in the truthfulness of which he 
honestly believes, he is obviously not guilty of a fraud”.271 In essence, the fraud 
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exception was formulated to fill a gap within the letter of credit law; namely, to 
prevent the dishonest beneficiary from abusing the documentary credit system.272 
Consequently, insofar as it constitutes an extraordinary rule as an exception to the 
fundamental autonomy principle, it should be applied cautiously and restricted strictly 
to its purpose, so as to preserve the commercial utility and efficacy of the letter of 
credit. Hence, the bona fide beneficiary falls outside the scope of the fraud rule and, 
thus, under the protection of the autonomy principle.  
Accordingly, where the fraud is that of a third party, the nullity exception, being based 
on the attributes of the tendered documents, may provide a complementary 
mechanism to eliminate the gap caused by the limit of the fraud rule. Nonetheless, 
documentary nullities should be strictly construed as referring solely to documents 
whose defect deprived them of all legal effect.273 It is only documents of such nature, 
being commercially worthless, that may erode the bank’s security interests.274 Beam 
Technologies v Standard Chartered Bank,275 has provided the groundwork for the 
further development of a general nullity exception. The line of reasoning behind said 
concept is the beneficiary’s duty to provide, as well as the bank’s obligation to pay 
against, a conforming presentation.276 The latter implicitly requires  the tendered 
documents to be genuine and accurate.277 A document amounting to a worthless piece 
of paper is in no way what is required under the credit, as mere facial conformity does 
not equal actual one. At first glance the nullity concept may be deemed as another 
restriction to the autonomy principle that hinders the commercial utility of 
documentary credits. Nevertheless, in a world where trust among commercial parties 
is of upmost value, said concept, similar to the fraud rule, insofar as it ensues the 
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277 Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Banking Corp [1941] 31 NYS (2d) 631, 633. 
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circulation of documents of value within documentary credit transactions, upholds the 
sanctity and integrity of the international banking system, allowing the parties to 
transact with confidence and certainty. Most notably, both the narrow fraud and 
nullity exceptions relate to a falsity contained in the documents, as opposed to purely 
contractual issues. The autonomy principle, while designed to shield the beneficiary 
from defences generated from the underlying contract, does not signify that said 
beneficiary should also be shielded from defences related to the documents 
themselves.278  
By contrast, the unconscionability and illegality concepts relate solely to circumstances 
surrounding the underlying contract, while the documents themselves are, apart from 
apparently complying, intrinsically true and genuine. To the extent that banks deal 
exclusively with documents alone,279 in the opinion of the author of this study, any 
exception to the autonomy principle should at the very least maintain a degree of 
connection to said documents, as the applicant mandates the bank to pay upon a 
conforming documentary presentation. Hence, the rejection of these two exceptions 
as defences against payment under the credit may be justified practically on the basis 
of the banks’ purely mechanical role of ensuring the strict compliance of the tendered 
documents with the credit.280 Contrary to the narrow fraud and nullity exceptions, to 
argue that the presented documents are tainted and, hence, non-complying based on 
the illegality of the underlying contract, would extend the meaning of documentary 
non-conformity ad absurdum. Accordingly, banks are not qualified to evaluate neither 
the beneficiary’s unconscionable conduct under the underling contract, a nebulous 
concept in and of itself, nor the possible illegal nature of said contract. To assume such 
a role would render documentary credit transactions slow and cumbersome. 
Additionally, as the pertinent jurisprudence evidences, the unconscionability281 and 
                                                 
278 Dora Neo, ‘A Nullity Exception in Letter of Credit Transactions?’ [2004] Sing J Legal Stud 46, 
67. 
279 International Chamber of Commerce, ‘Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary 
Credits (UCP) 600’ (2006) art 5. 
280 Ibid art 2, 7(a) & 8(a). 
281 Royal Design Studio Pte Ltd v Chang Development Pte Ltd [1990] 1 SLR 1116; Kvaerner 
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illegality282 exceptions seem to be more suitable for bank guarantees and standby 
letters of credits, where payment is contingent on the performance and circumstances 
of the underlying contract, as opposed to commercial letters of credit. The latter 
category, as a form of guaranteed payment of the contract price, equal to “cash in 
hand”,283 relies on its autonomy from the underlying transaction for its appeal and 
commercial utility. Unconscionability and illegality within the context of commercial 
letters of credit, as ordinary contract disputes, can be addressed through the use of 
alternative judicial avenues that do not undermine the credit contract. Consequently, 
in relation to these two concepts, commercial letters of credit are the one area where 
the courts should adopt a hands-off approach, if they are vigilant in safeguarding the 
very premise upon which the letters of credit rely; namely, the cardinal autonomy 
principle. 
As a last comment, it is worth mentioning that, considering the UCP’s near universal 
acceptance and success in regulating documentary letters of credit, for any exception 
to reach maturity, its application should be addressed within the UCP’s provisions, 
lifting said exception from the national to the international level. This view is 
supported by the UCP’s function as regulator of the duties and obligations of banks in 
dealing with international letter of credit transactions. By explicitly accepting the 
narrow fraud and nullity exceptions, hence, implicitly rejecting the unconscionability 
and illegality concepts, in accordance with the position of this thesis, it shall limit the 
disturbances as to the autonomy principle, while upholding the viability of the 
documentary letter of credit by bringing the balance between the interests of the 
parties back near equilibrium. The ICC, as the body with the expertise to do so, may 
achieve the right balance between the autonomy principle and its exceptions, an 
exercise where the courts themselves have systematically failed. While the UCP, with 
regard to its form, constitutes merely a set of contractual terms, hence, is subordinate 
                                                                                                                                               
604; Dauphin Offshore Engineering & Trading Pte Ltd v The Private Office of HRH Sheikh Sultan 
bin Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan [2000] 1 SLR 657; Hiap Tian Soon Construction Pte Ltd v Hola 
Development Pte Ltd [2003] 1 SLR 667; JBE Properties Pte Ltd v Gammon Pte Ltd [2010] SGCA 
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282 Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 WLR 1152 (CA); Mahonia Ltd v JP 
Morgan Chase Bank (No 2) [2004] EWHC 1938 (Comm). 
283 Power Curber International Ltd v National Bank of Kuwait SAK [1981] 1 WLR 1233, 1241; 
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to national law; given its predominant influence, it is reasonable to expect the courts 
to give to its provisions on the fraud and nullity exceptions the same weight they have 
traditionally bestowed to its other provisions.284 Insofar as the UCP rules stipulate the 
autonomy principle itself,285 why should they not further define the exceptions and 
limits thereof?   
5. Conclusions 
The autonomy principle safeguards the interests of the seller via the provision of an 
irrevocable and unconditional entitlement to payment against conforming documents, 
irrespective of any disputes that may arise out of the underlying transaction. In the 
same vein, the buyer’s interests are protected by requiring the tendered documents to 
strictly comply with the terms and conditions of the credit, thus, indicating the seller’s 
proper performance under the underlying contract. Nevertheless, the system, insofar 
as it allows payment against apparently complying, yet fraudulent or worthless 
documents, appears to favor the seller. Any commercial device that provides 
preferential treatment to one party at the expense of the other is doomed to 
eventually disappear. Accordingly, certain exceptions to the autonomy principle; 
namely, fraud, nullity, unconscionability and illegality, have either found recognition or 
received favorable comments in various common law jurisdictions.   
Notwithstanding that the fraud exception rule has been widely recognized, so as to 
alleviate the above-mentioned imbalance; the analysis of the U.S., English and 
Canadian approaches allows us to conclude that the treatise of the issue has received a 
varying, fragmented treatment within the common law world. The research of the 
fraud rule under U.K. law, in particular, reflects the near impossibility of its application 
in practice, primarily due to the strong position of the autonomy principle in the 
documentary credit system. With respect to the ambit of the fraud rule, a rather 
controversial issue among jurisdictions, the thesis strongly supports the narrow fraud 
                                                 
284 Ross P Buckley and Xiang Gao, ‘The Development of the Fraud Rule in the Letter of Credit 
Law: The Journey So Far and the Road Ahead’ (2002) 23 U Pa J Int’l Econ L 663, 712. 
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rule, strictly referring to documentary fraud, as opposed to further extending the rule 
to fraud manifested in the underlying transaction. Insofar as the latter ultimately takes 
the form of the former to induce payment, the narrow formulation alone protects 
against the majority of the fraudulent cases encountered in the documentary credit 
system, while concurrently adhering to the contractual allocation of risk as between 
the parties and best serving the rationale behind the fraud rule; namely the abuse of 
the letter of credit system by the fraudulent beneficiary, not the absolute 
condemnation of fraud. 
Additionally, to the extent that the fraud exception rule is generally restricted to fraud 
committed or known to the beneficiary, on the basis of the ex turpi causa non oritur 
action maxim, the prospective universal acceptance of the nullity exception appears to 
complement the fraud rule, filling the gap created by the restricted application of the 
latter. In that regard, the Singaporean Beam Technologies case286 departed from the 
English position, expressed in Montrod,287 by recognizing a separate nullity exception. 
The formulation found in Beam Technologies may serve as the basis for the further 
development of the rule. After analysing the arguments in support and against the 
nullity exception, the thesis argued that a limited nullity exception, referring solely to 
void ab initio documents, appears to be an appropriate development on the basis of 
the prevention of the circulation of commercially worthless documents within the 
documentary credit mechanism, as well as the beneficiary’s duty to be diligent in 
providing conforming documents for payment, especially when produced by third 
parties.  
It is evident that the ideology of complete separation between the letter of credit 
transaction and the underlying contract may only be envisaged when the tendered 
documents are safely presumed true and genuine. A document, either fraudulent or 
merely null and void, known to the bank as such prior to payment, under no 
reasonable definition may be regarded as a complying documentary tender. Moreover, 
both the narrow fraud and nullity exceptions, insofar as they retain a degree of 
connection to the documents themselves, cause the least interference to the 
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autonomy principle, while upholding the integrity of, and hence, trust in, the banking 
and documentary credit systems.  
Conversely, under the unconscionability and illegality concepts, the tendered 
documents are in no way affected by the unconscionable conduct under, or illegal 
nature of, the underlying transaction; hence, constituting a truly conforming 
documentary presentation. Said concepts, to the extent that they allow purely 
contractual issues to defeat the letter of credit, obliterate the autonomy of the credit, 
hindering altogether the efficacy and commercial utility of the letter of credit as an 
independent, autonomous guarantee of payment. Additionally, it is recommended, on 
the basis of the pertinent case law, to restrict the possible application of these two 
exceptions to standby letters of credit and demand guarantees, as opposed to 
extending them to further encompass commercial letters of credit. The former, to the 
extent that payment is contingent on the principal’s default under the underlying 
contract, maintain a closer link as to the conduct and circumstances relating to said 
underlying contract. By contrast, the autonomy principle is fundamental as to 
commercial letters of credit, whose function is not that of a security but of an 
independent payment method of the contract price. 
The UCP, having become the predominant influence in the area of documentary letters 
of credit, constitutes the appropriate instrument to incorporate any recognized 
exception to the autonomy principle, elevating it from the national to the international 
level. By recognizing the narrow fraud and nullity exceptions, thus, tethering the 
exceptions to the documents themselves, under explicit harmonized, uniform 
conditions, it shall provide a secure and predictable environment for international 
trading partners. The ICC, by utilizing its expertise in regulating international letter of 
credit transactions, may balance the autonomy principle and its exceptions in a way 
that best serves both the interests of the importer-buyer and the exporter-seller, 
hence, upholding the utility and subsequent viability of the documentary credit 
system. In any case, to the extent that the UCP stipulates the autonomy principle itself, 
it seems appropriate to further define the exceptions and limits thereof.    
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